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Abstract 
The relationship between trade liberalisation and informal activity has not 
received the attention, whether theoretical or empirical, that it may deserve. 
The conventional view poses that trade liberalisation would cause a rise in 
informality. This paper uses three different data sets to assess the sign of the 
relationship. Empirical results provide a mixed picture. Macro founded data 
tend to produce results supporting the conventional view. Micro founded 
data do not. Empirical results also suggest that while informal output 
increases with deeper trade liberalisation, informal employment falls.  
 
JEL: F13, F16, O17, C23 Keywords: Informal Sector, Trade Liberalisation, 
Cross-sectional Analysis, Time Series Analysis, Panel Analysis 
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1  Introduction 
Informality refers to that share of a country’s production of goods and 
services that does not comply with government regulation. Informal activity 
is a common feature of most countries, however it is greater in size and more 
pervasive in developing countries (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Tokman, 2007).   
  
Informality is often linked to trade liberalisation. Under the conventional 
view, the informal sector represents the inferior segment of a dual labour 
market, which expands counter-cyclically during downturns when workers 
are rationed out of the formal labour market. In this setting, trade 
liberalisation, if perceived as a force of greater competition for domestic 
producers, is expected to lead to a rise in informality, as firms shed formal 
workers (inputs) to cut costs. However, this conventional view of informality 
has been challenged on various grounds.  
 
First, informal activity is not exclusively residual. There is significant evidence 
that informality, at least in parts, is driven by dynamic, small-scale 
entrepreneurial activity. This goes back to the seminal work of Hart (1972, 
1973) on African labour markets, which has recently been confirmed for Latin 
America by Maloney (2004) and Perry et al. (2007). La Porta and Shleifer 
(2008) support the empirical relevance of alternative views on informality 
using three sets of surveys of both official and unofficial firms conducted 
recently by the World Bank.1 The notion of informal entrepreneurship is also 
noticeable in the ILO’s official definition of informality: in 1993, the 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) 2  adopted  the 
following international statistical definition of the informal sector: namely, all 
unregistered (or unincorporated) enterprises below a certain size, including 
(a) micro-enterprises owned by informal employers who hire one or more 
                                                 
1 The Enterprise Surveys, the Informal Surveys and the Micro Surveys. 
2 The primary source is the ILO (1993).   3
employees on a continuing basis; and (b) own-account operations owned by 
individuals who may employ contributing family workers and employees on 
an occasional basis.3  
 
Second, only certain types of shocks and a specific regulatory environment 
cause a counter-cyclical response of informal activity.  Fiess, Fugazza and 
Maloney (2002, 2008) develop a theoretical model where the sign of the 
relationship between relative formal/informal earnings and the relative size 
of labour force depends on the nature of economic shocks and on the 
tightness of labour regulations. A rise in informality is not necessarily the 
outcome of a negative economic shock it can also result from a positive shock 
to the non-tradable sector. The model is tested empirically using time series 
for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico and results confirm the existence 
of pro-cyclical movements in line with theoretical predictions. 
 
Third, the relationship between trade liberalisation and informality is 
ambiguous from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Moreover, 
empirical evidence for a large sample of countries is lacking.  
 
This paper provides comprehensive empirical evidence on the relationship 
between trade liberalisation and informality for a large set of countries. For 
this purpose we provide evidence from time series, cross-section and panel 
analyses. As informal activity by its very nature evades officially records, 
measurement becomes a difficult issue. We use three alternative measures of 
informality, which all have been used in the literature, but never in parallel. 
The first is a survey-based measure of informal labour market activity from 









the ILO. The second is Schneider’s (2005, 2007) measure of informal activity 
which is derived from a combination of indirect measures of informal 
production based on excess currency demand and latent variable 
methodologies.  The third is based on the macro-eclectic approach of 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), where the size of the informal economy is 
measured from the discrepancy between electricity consumption, which is 
taken as an indicator of overall economic activity, and the official gross 
domestic product.  
 
Our empirical results offer a mixed picture and no clear-cut conclusion can be 
drawn. While unconditional cross sectional correlations support the view that 
trade liberalisation induces a reduction of informality, whether in terms of 
employment share or in terms of output share, static panel results do not. 
Results from co-integration analysis suggest that more openness to trade is 
associated with greater informal employment and output for the majority of 
countries. Lower trade restrictions, on the contrary, appear to generate lower 
informal employment and output in most cases. Finally, systems GMM 
estimation generates contrasting result across datasets. In particular, fewer 
trade restrictions are associated with more informal output but less informal 
employment. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews major 
theoretical and empirical contributions on the link between trade 
liberalisation and informality. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical 
methodologies and section 4 presents results. The last section discusses 
possible policy implications and further research orientations. 
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2  Trade Liberalisation and Informality: Theoretical 
Insights and Country Experiences 
2.1  Theoretical Insights  
The relationship between trade liberalisation and informality has received 
little attention, whether from a theoretical or empirical point of view. 
According to a consensual but not necessarily formal argument trade 
liberalisation is expected to increase competition for domestic producers. In 
an effort to lower production costs, domestic producers will seek informally-
produced inputs (in the extreme all inputs would be produced informally), 
which are cheaper since informal producers generally do not comply with 
labour or fiscal regulations. Greater demand for informally produced inputs is 
therefore expected to drive the extension of the informal sector following 
trade liberalisation.   
 
Goldberg and Pacvnic (2003) adopt a model that unambiguously generates 
such a positive relationship. Their model is based on a dynamic efficiency 
wage model with three essential assumptions. First, the representative firm 
faces demand uncertainty. Second, the representative firm can hire workers 
either from a pool of formal or informal workers. Third, formal employment 
is subject to labour market legislation and formal workers receive benefits and 
severance pay on dismissal. Trade liberalisation is modelled as a change in the 
probability function that governs price shocks. Goldberg and Pacvnic (2003)’s 
model suggests that the impact of trade liberalisation on informality depends 
on the degree of labour market liberalisation: the less flexible labour markets, 
the greater the reallocation from the formal to the informal sector. 
 
Not all theoretical models provide however such clear-cut predictions on the 
relationship between trade liberalisation and informality. For instance, in the 
heterogeneous firm model of Aleman-Castilla (2006), trade liberalisation (i.e. 
lower trade costs) implies that some firms will find it more profitable to enter   6
the formal sector rather to remain informal. The least productive informal 
firms will be forced to exit the industry and only the most productive (formal) 
firms will export to international markets. Here, trade liberalisation reduces 
the incidence of informality. Moreover, both, the exit of the least productive 
firms and the rise in output of the most productive (formal) firms lead to an 
aggregate increase in productivity.  
 
The above models assume that all goods can be traded in principle. Non 
tradability is endogenously determined and depends only on firms' 
characteristics, not goods' characteristics.  If some goods are allowed to be 
non-tradable,  the impact of trade liberalisation on informality will 
additionally depend on the reaction of the real exchange rate and/or relative 
sector productivities. To illustrate, if the informal sector is equated with the 
non-tradable goods sector, and, if non-tradable goods are only for 
consumption, then the relationship between trade openness and informality 
could become negative. In this context, trade liberalisation would lower the 
price of the non-tradable good in terms of the tradable good (i.e. a real 
depreciation) and this would decrease the size of the informal sector.4 In 
certain circumstances trade liberalisation could lead to a real appreciation5 
and hence increase the size of the informal sector.  
 
In a situation where formal firms use non-tradable (informal) goods as inputs, 
additional arbitrage conditions enter the relationship of trade liberalisation 
and informality. Trade liberalisation (a fall in trade costs) exposes 
uncompetitive firms to greater import competition. For these firms the use of 
cheaper, informally produced inputs may present a survival strategy. 
However, as formal wages may well rise with greater labour demand from 
exporting (old and new) firms, informal wages may also increase to eliminate 





any arbitrage in workers’ occupational choice. The sign of the relationship 
between trade liberalisation and informality will therefore depend on which 
force dominates. Furthermore, if pre-reform formal wages are determined by 
labour regulation (e.g. a binding minimum nominal wage), upward pressures 
on formal wages post  reform might be slightly undermined; this would 
increase the chance to observe more informality as a consequence of trade 
liberalisation. 
 
The fiscal environment can also influence the relationship between trade 
liberalisation and informality. Existing models generally assume that public 
expenditures fully adapt to fiscal revenues without specifying how fiscal 
adjustment is actually achieved. Fiscal consolidation may require higher taxes 
or new fiscal instruments and both are likely to affect firms’ incentives to 
extend informal inputs and workers’ choices to become informal.  
 
Theoretical predictions of how trade liberalisation impacts informality are 
ambiguous at best; the overall size of the informal sector could rise or fall 
with trade liberalisation. We next review existing empirical studies on trade 
liberalisation and informality. 
 
2.2  Country Experiences 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between trade liberalisation and 
informality is limited and generally country specific. Most of the evidence 
relates to Brazil, Colombia and Mexico for which rich relevant and reliable 
micro datasets are available. 
 
Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) use household survey data for Brazil and 
Colombia collected over the 1980s and the 1990s. They find no evidence of 
any significant relationship between trade liberalisation and informality in 
Brazil, whether positive of negative. For Colombia, they present evidence that   8
informality has increased after trade liberalisation. However, this finding 
appears directly related to the degree of labour market flexibility. Pavcnik and 
Goldberg (2003) report that prior to labour market reform, when costs of 
firing formal workers were high, an industry-specific tariff reduction has been 
associated with a greater likelihood of becoming informal. After labour 
market reform, however, industry-specific tariff reductions have been 
associated with smaller increases in the probability of becoming informal. 
 
Aleman-Castilla (2006) uses the NAFTA experience to assess the impact of 
trade liberalisation on informality in Mexico. Using Mexican and US import 
tariff data and the Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour, Aleman-
Castilla (2006) findings suggest that lower import tariffs are related to lower 
informality in tradable industries. Results also suggest that informality 
decreases less in industries where import penetration is high and more in 
industries with greater export orientation. 
 
Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) and Aleman-Castilla (2006) use a similar two-
step estimation approach. In a first step, a linear probability model of informal 
employment is estimated. Explanatory variables include worker 
characteristics and industry dummies capturing workers’ industry affiliation. 
Coefficients of the latter are defined as industry-informality differentials. 
These differentials are then used as the dependent variable in the second-step 
estimations. They are regressed against import tariffs across years and 
resulting coefficients are taken as measures of the impact of trade 
liberalisation on informality.  
 
A related paper, although based on a different empirical approach, is Boni, 
Gosh and Maloney (2007). Boni et al. (2007) study gross worker flows to 
explain the rising informality in Brazil’s metropolitan labour markets from 
1983 to 2002. This period covers two economic cycles, several macro economic 
stabilization plans, a far-reaching trade liberalisation, and changes in labour   9
legislation through the Constitutional reform of 1988. Secular movements in 
the levels and the volatility of gross flows suggest that the rise in informality 
during that period was largely caused by a reduction in job finding rates in 
the formal sector. Part of the remainder is linked to the constitutional reform 
which contributed to rising labour costs and reduced labour market 
flexibility; only a small fraction of the observed rise in informality is explained 
by trade liberalisation. 
 
In an earlier study, Currie and Harrison (1997) assess the impact of trade 
reform on employment in manufacturing firms in Morocco in the 1980s. This 
paper does not investigate the direct impact of trade reform on informality 
but offers insights on the role of trade protection on labour market 
composition. Currie and Harrison (1997) use a survey of manufacturing firms 
with more than ten employees. Their results suggest that employment in the 
average firm has been unaffected by the reduction of tariffs and the 
elimination of quotas. However, exporting firms and industries most affected 
by the reforms (textiles, beverages and apparel) experienced a significant 
decline in employment.6 Currie and Harrison (1997)’s results further indicate 
that government-controlled firms behaved quite differently from privately-
own firms. Government-controlled firms actually increased employment in 
response to tariff reductions, mostly by hiring low-paid temporary workers.  
 
Empirical studies to date suggest that informality can respond to trade 
liberalisation either positively or negatively, depending on country and 
industry characteristics.  
 
3  Data and Empirical Strategy 
 




Our estimates of the size of the informal sector come from three different 
datasets. The ILO is a micro-founded, survey-based measure which provides 
a directly observable measure of the share of informal employment. 
Schneider’s (2005, 2007) informality measure and the macro-eclectic approach 
(Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996) are both macro-founded, indirect measures 
of informal output in total GDP.   
 
3.1  Datasets and dependent variables 
 
The first dataset used in this paper is from ILO. The ILO statistical definition 
of informality represents an important step towards a better and more 
consensual measurement of informality around the world. In 1993, the 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) adopted the following 
international statistical definition of the informal sector: namely, all 
unregistered (or unincorporated) enterprises below a certain size, including 
(a) micro-enterprises owned by informal employers who hire one or more 
employees on a continuing basis; and (b) own-account operations owned by 
individuals who may employ contributing family workers and employees on 
an occasional basis.  Data on informal employment from the ILO allow us to 
construct an unbalanced panel for 32 countries from 1990 to 2004; the 
corresponding variable is Info_ILO. 
 
The second dataset used in this paper takes Schneider’s (2005, 2007) estimates 
of informal activity. Schneider’s estimates are derived from a combination of 
the Currency Demand Approach and the DYMIMIC method of Giles. 
Schneider’s (2005) provides a snapshot of informality for 110 countries in 
1990/91, 1994/95, 1999/2000 and Schneider (2007) provides annual 
observations for the same countries during 2000 and 2004. The corresponding 
variable is Info_S. 
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Third, we use the macro-eclectic approach proposed by Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996). According to this method, the size of the informal economy 
may be measured from any discrepancy between an indicator of the overall 
economic activity and the official gross domestic product. Given the high 
correlation between consumption of electricity and economic activity, the 
growth rate of electricity consumption serves as an indicator of the evolution 
of the total gross domestic product. Any difference between the growth of 
electricity consumption and the growth of the official gross domestic product 
is attributed to changes in the size of the informal economy. We use data on 
total electricity consumption from World Development Indicators and real 
GDP from IMF IFS (2006) and seed values for the size of the informal 
economy for 2000 from Schneider (2007). An advantage of the macro-eclectic 
approach is that it is the least data intensive. It enables us therefore to 
construct a balanced panel on informality from 1990 to 2004 for 66 countries. 
The corresponding variable is Info_Macro.7 
 
None of our three measure of informality is however without criticism. While 
surveys-based Info_ILO provides a direct measure of the information required 
to identify the informal sector, surveys commonly suffer from several errors 
related to design, coverage, non-response, and measurement and processing. 
Furthermore, differences in national survey design often make comparison 
across countries and over time difficult.   
 
The macro-eclectic approach has been mainly criticised on the following 
grounds, and similar criticism extends to Schneider (2005, 2007): (1) a large 
part of informal activity (e.g. personal services) does not require intensive 
energy use or could be supplied from alternative energy sources (e.g. coal, 
wood). (2) technological progress prompted efficiency gains in both demand 
and supply of energy (e.g. low energy devices) as well as money (e.g. credit 
                                                 
7 Country coverage for the macro‐eclectic and ILO measures are reported in Appendix 1. We 
refer the reader to Schneider (2007) for the listing of countries in his sample.   12
cards, online banking). (3) the elasticity of electricity/GDP or money 
demand/GDP may not be stable over time or across country.  
 
Despite these issues, there is a reasonable amount of correlation between 
these different estimates of informal activity. Appendix  2 (Table A3 and 
Figures A1 and A2) provides the respective correlation coefficients. 
Correlation is highest in the cross-section. As an example, in 2004, Info_S 
correlates at 0.78 with Info_ILO; Info_Macro correlates Info_ ILO measure at 
0.68. Correlation is the highest between Info_S and Info_Macro at 0.97.  
 
To assess co-movement between alternative measures of informality over 
time, we look at the correlation between changes in Info_ILO  and  Info_S 
during 2000 and 2004 as well as at cointegration between Info_ILO and 
Info_Macro between 1990 and 2004 (Appendix 2, Table A4). Even though co-
movement between different informality measures over time is lower 
compared to the correlation in the cross-section, co-movement is nevertheless 
sizeable. The correlation between first differences in Info_ILO and Info_S is 
0.38 during 2000 and 2004. Cointegration tests between the ILO measure and 
the macro-eclectic measure of informality indicate that 16 out of 23 series 
(about 70%) are cointegrated (see Table A5 in Appendix 2).8   
 
3.2  Explanatory variables 
The selection of our explanatory variables is guided by the empirical literature. 
They are the following: 
 
lGDPpc refers to the log of GDP per capita in constant 2000 US Dollars and is 
taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007). The 
relationship between informality and GDP per capita has been documented in 
various studies. For instance, Blau (1987), Maloney (2001), Gollin (2002) and 
                                                 
8 The use of first differences on cointegation analysis seems justified given evidence of non-stationarity 
presented in Section 4.2.   13
Loayza and Rigolini (2006) assess the relationship between GDP per capita 
and self employment. 
 
The variable Lab_Flex measures labour market flexibility and consists of the 
Fraser Institute index of labour freedom as published in Gwartney and 
Lawson (2006). The index is a composite of four equally weighted 
components, consisting of minimum wages, rigidity of hours, difficulty of 
firing redundant employees and the cost of firing redundant workers. It 
varies from zero to ten, where ten represents the highest degree of flexibility. 
The general burden imposed by stringent regulation, in particular in the 
labour market, is generally perceived as an important determinant of 
informality. Various empirical findings (e.g. Goldberg and Pavnic (2003) 
discussed previously, and Heckman and Pages (2000)) support this view.  
 
The variable Corruption measures freedom of corruption. Corruption is 
equivalent to the sub-component Corruption of the ICRG country risk guide. 
The index varies from one to six, where six represents the lowest levels of 
corruptions. This variable is usually included in regressions to control for the 
overall quality and efficiency of institutions in promoting formal economic 
activities. A more corrupt economy could be associated with poorer 
institutions and higher costs of production in the formal sector, as expressed 
for instance in de Soto (1989).  
 
Following Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) we use different proxies for trade 
openness to investigate the stability of our results. In the context of the trade-
growth literature, Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) show that the positive impact 
of trade on growth is less robust than often claimed and subject to difficulties 
in measuring openness.    
 
The variable Trade/GDP, measures total merchandise trade as a percentage of 
GDP and is taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007).    14
The variable Tariff, measures a country’s effectively applied average external 
tariff rate.9 The measure comes from the UNCTAD-TRAINS database.10  
 
Dreher (2006) presents an index of globalisation (The KOF Index of 
Globalization) that comprises three dimensions of globalisation that have 
been highlighted by Keohane and Nye (2000) and others. Economic 
globalisation captures economic flows of goods, capital and services. Political 
globalisation refers to the international diffusion of policy, and social 
globalisation captures the spread of ideas, information, images, and people 
around the world.  These three indices make up the overall globalisation 
index and consist by themselves of various sub-components, where the sub-
component economic globalisation is of most interest to us. The economic 
globalisation index consists of two sub-components: actual economic flows 
(KOF-Flows) and trade restrictions (KOF-Restrictions). The sub-index on actual 
economic flows includes data on trade, FDI and portfolio investment. Data on 
trade (sum of a country’ exports and imports) and FDI flows are provided by 
the World Bank Development Indicators, stocks of FDI are provided by 
UNCTAD World Investment Report. Portfolio investment is derived from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. The sub-index of restrictions on trade 
and capital is composed by hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on 
international trade (as a share of current revenue) and an index of capital 
controls. Data for this index are mainly from Gwartney and Lawson (2006). 
 
We also considered the trade liberalisation index of Wacziarg and Welch 
(2008), which extends and robustifies the Sachs and Warner (1995) measure of 
openness. However, as underlined in Wacziarg and Welch (2008) the panel 
variability of the indicator is extremely limited for the 1990s; we therefore 
consider it only in our cross-sectional analysis. 





4  Results 
Panel data are by definition two-dimensional: cross-sectional and time. We 
first exploit the two composing dimensions separately in order to inform and 
qualify panel results. Cross-sectional analysis indicates how the relationship 
between informality and trade varies across countries at a given point in time, 
time series analysis investigates the change in the relationship between in 
informality and trade over time within a given country. Inference from time 
series analysis is also important to guide the panel approach. For instance, 
non-stationary introduces severe biases with purely static panel estimation, 
which makes a dynamic estimation approach more appropriate. 
 
 
4.1 Cross-sectional evidence 
We first explore cross-sectional evidence. Table 1 displays unconditional 
correlations between the three alternative measures of informality and our 
explanatory variables.  High GDP per capita, low levels of corruption are 
significantly correlated with low levels of informality, independent of the 
measure of informality applied. Labour market flexibility is only significantly 
correlated with Info_Macro, however, the correlation is low (-0.13). There is a 
significant relationship between trade and informality and measures of trade 
restrictions (Tariff,  KOF-Restrictions), measures of trade volume (Trade/GDP 
and KOF-Flows) as well as the Wacziarg and Welch (2008) indicator of trade 
openness, point into the same direction: trade openness appears to be 
negatively associated with informality: lower tariffs and greater trade flows 
are associated with lower levels of informality. The relationship is most 
apparent between informality and trade restrictions and we find a 
particularly strong correlation between the KOF-Restrictions  and  Info_ILO 
(0.81).    
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Appendix 3 (Figures A3 to A5) presents scatter plots between the various 
measures of informality and trade; the relationship appears not sensitive to 
excluding developed countries. 
 
There is further significant correlation between our control variables, in 
particularly corruption and GDP per capita (0.71), as well as between the 
alternative measures of trade. However, correlations among the trade 
variables range from 0.12 to 0.69. This suggests that our different trade 
variables capture different dimensions of trade openness.  
 
Table 1 around here 
 
4.2 Time series evidence  
We first pre-test our data for non-stationarity using the Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003), Hadri (2000) and Madalla and Wu (1999) panel unit root tests.  
 
Unit root tests  
Im et al. (2003) and Hadri (2000) panel unit root tests both require balanced 
panels, we therefore also apply the Maddala and Wu (1999) test. This test, 
which is also referred to as the Fisher test, combines the p-values from N 
independent unit root tests, it assumes that all series are non-stationary under 
the null hypothesis against the alternative that at least one series in the panel 
is stationary. ZFisher follows a chi-square distributions with N*2 degrees of 
freedom. Due to the pooling of p-values from independent unit root tests, 
ZFisher can be applied to unbalanced panels.    
 
Table 2 reports the results of the unit root tests and provides strong evidence 
in favour of non-stationarity. The Im et al. (2003) ZIPS panel unit root tests 
only reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for KOF-Flows. The Hadri (2000) 
Zμ panel rejects the null of stationarity for all variables. Results based on the 
Fisher tests of Madalla and Wu (1999) only fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
panel unit roots for Trade/GDP.   17
 
Table 2 around here 
 
Cointegration Analysis 
Given strong evidence of non-stationarity, we use the Johansen (1988, 2002) 
cointegration approach to investigate the relationship between informality 
and trade liberalisation from a time series perspective. In the presence of 
cointegration, super-consistency implies that we can concentrate on the 
relationship between informality and trade liberalisation without fear of 
omitted variable bias; we therefore abstract from other control variables in 
this section11. 
 
Given the relatively small sample sizes, we simulate critical values and apply 
a Bartlett correction to the trace statistics following Johansen (2002).   
 
We find strong evidence of cointegration between both measures of 
informality and two trade liberalisation indicators (Trade/GDP and KOF-
Restrictions). Results of the individual cointegration tests are displayed in 
Tables A6 and A7 in Appendix 4. Coefficients are in vector form and 
normalized on the informality variable (not reported).  
 
There appears to be a fair degree of heterogeneity with respect to the sign of 
the empirical relationship between trade liberalisation and informality. For 
Trade/GDP and Info_Macro we find that in almost 70 percent of cases greater 
trade openness is associated with higher informality between 1990 and 2004.  
For  Trade/GDP and Info_ILO, we find a near 50:50 split between countries 
where informality rises or falls with trade liberalisation. Not all countries in 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of super‐consistency see Stock (1987).   18
Info_Macro are available for Info_ILO; for countries that appear in both data 
sets signs coincide in almost 60% of cases.   
 
Results are similar when considering KOF-Restrictions as the measure of trade 
liberalisation. In 70 percent of cases, lower restrictions on trade have led to an 
increase of informal output according to Info_Macro. For Info_ ILO set the split 
remains around 50:50. Where we have country information from both 
informality data sets, results are coherent in almost 2/3 of observable cases. 
 
Our time series results by country seem to corroborate evidence from cases 
studies in the literature. We support Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) findings of 
a more positive link between trade liberalisation and informality in Colombia 
(deeper trade liberalisation increases informality). We also support Currie and 
Harrison (1998) finding of an adverse impact of trade liberalisation on 
informality in Morocco. Trade/GDP and KOF_Restrictions provide 
contradicting evidence on the relationship between trade openness and 
informality for Brazil and Mexico, and this may explain why Pavcnik and 
Goldberg (2003) and Aleman-Castilla (2006) fail to identify a clear relationship 
in these two countries. 
 
Overall, time series analysis indicates that for a given country different 
measures of informality do not necessarily respond in a similar manner to the 
same measure of trade liberalisation. Conversely, the same measure of 
informality does not relate to different measures of trade liberalisation in the 
same fashion. However, if a dominant pattern had to be identified, results 
suggest that it should be the one of the conventional view: greater openness to 
trade leads to higher informality, whether the latter is thought of in terms of 
employment or in terms of output.  
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4.3 Panel Evidence 
Cross sectional analysis and time series investigation produce contrasting 
results, suggesting that an approach that merges both dimensions is needed 
before any possibly robust and clear cut conclusion can be reached.  
 
Time series analysis points to unit roots in most of the variables under 
consideration. This would make the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator of 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) which explicitly accounts for non-stationarity 
appropriate. To robustify results, we however also report panel estimates 
based on static fixed effects as well as systems-GMM.  The latter approach is 
able to accommodate possible endogeneity of any of our explanatory 
variables.  
 
The PMG estimator requires a near-balanced panel and can therefore only be 
applied to Info_Macro. GMM works best for large N and small T, which makes 
it ideal for Info_S, where we have four time series observations on informality 
for 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2004. 
 
Static approach: Fixed effects 
A fixed effects static approach excludes the explicit treatment of both non-
stationarity and endogeneity issues. Labour market flexibility and the 
corruption indices are not found to be significant in any of the fixed effects 
regressions. Because of their low time variability over the period under 
scrutiny, both variables effects are likely to be absorbed by the country fixed 
effects. Thus, we removed them from estimations without loss of either 
efficiency or power. 
 
Table 3 provides the findings for Info_Macro and Table 4 for the Info_ILO.12 
Since Pesaran (2004)’s test of cross sectional independence indicates the 
                                                 
12 Results for Info_S are not reported here as they are quite similar to those obtained for 
Info_Macro.   20
presence of cross-sectional correlation for Info_Macro, we include time 
dummies. Time dummies appear to be sufficient to remove the cross-sectional 
correlation in the panel.13 
 
Both datasets generate comparable results in both sign and magnitude for 
most indicators of trade liberalisation.  The Info_Macro panel (Table 3) 
strongly suggests that more openness and lower tariffs lead to higher 
informality. The Info_ILO panel (Table 4) broadly corroborates this story, 
although coefficient estimates are sometimes only significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
Table 3 and 4 here 
 
Dynamic Non-stationary Panel: Pooled Mean Group Estimates 
To account for non-stationarity in panels, we apply the Pooled Mean Group 
and the Mean Group estimator. The Mean Group (MG) estimator (see Pesaran 
and  Smith  1995)  is  based  on  estimating  N  time‐series  regressions  and 
averaging the coefficients, while the PMG estimator relies on a combination of 
pooling and averaging of coefficients. The MG estimator allows intercepts, 
slopes  and  error  variances  to  differ,  while  the  PMG  estimator  imposes 
homogeneity on long‐run coefficients across groups. If homogeneity cannot 
be rejected, the PMG estimator is consistent and more efficient than the MG 
estimator.  Hausman tests select the PMG as the efficient estimator and 
indicate long-run relationship identified between trade openness and 
informality holds across groups. Results are provided in Table 5. Coefficient 
estimates are similar in size to results based on static fixed effects, but they are 
generally more significant; they also suggests that more openness and fewer 
restrictions on trade lead to higher informal output.   
 
Table 6 about here 
 
                                                 
13 We also included cross‐sectional averages of dependent and independent variables as an 
alternative means to account for cross‐sectional dependence and results are similar.   21  22
Endogeneity 
Fixed effects and PMG estimations do not account for possible endogeneity. 
Endogeneity could arise if the size of the informal sector influences the degree 
of trade liberalization in a country. An economy which is largely informal is 
likely to be poorly industrialized. In that context, economic power is usually 
highly concentrated and could be expected to be closely related to political 
power. Any reform would then most likely be guided by vested interests. In 
the case of trade policy, a strong preference for high protection for domestic 
productive sectors would most probably be the dominant decision factor in 
any reform. As a consequence lower tariff cuts would be observed in 
economies with relatively larger informal sectors.  
 
We then formally test for endogeneity in various cross sections retrieved from 
our panel data set (not reported). We do find evidence, although not 
systematic, of endogeneity. This suggests that results obtained in a dynamic 
GMM panel set up are likely to be the most reliable. 
 
Dynamic approach: GMM 
We implement Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
Dynamic Panel Data Estimator. The approach is based on the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) and a systems estimator for our instruments 
(lagged values of the variables themselves).  
 
Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8 report results for the Info_Macro, Info_ILO and 
Info_S. Contrary to result found with static panel estimations and PMG, the 
different measures of informality do not generate fully consistent results. 
 
Table 6, 7 and 8 about here 
 
As expected, we find that informality decreases with GDP per capita in all 
cases. Less corrupted administrations are also associated with less informality.   23
The labour flexibility variable enters the estimation with the expected sign 
(not reported): more flexible labour markets reduce the incidence of 
informality. However, it is never significant at a reasonable level of 
confidence.  
 
Trade liberalisation measured as the share of total trade in GDP enters 
insignificantly in all estimations. The composite flow measure from the KOF 
Index of Globalization (KOF-Flows) is significant for the two macro measures 
of informality. Coefficient estimates are always positive when significant. This 
indicates that more openness to trade generates higher shares of informal 
production. 
 
When using tariffs or KOF-Restrictions as the indicator of trade liberalisation, 
we find that coefficient estimates are significant at least at 10% in all 
regressions but one.  We find contrasting evidence across datasets but not 
across indicators. For the two macro datasets (Info_Macro and Info_S), less 
restricted trade is always associated with a larger share of informal output in 
total GDP. For Info_ILO the share of informal employment falls with less 
restricted trade for both indicators of trade liberalisation.  
 
In all set-ups results are not affected by the number of endogenous variables. 
It is well known that too many instruments in system GMM can bias the 
results. Our results are further robust to the inclusion of time dummies. 
However, we find that coefficient estimates prove robust to treating all 
variables as endogenous or only trade and informality, which improves the 
group/ instrument ratio (second column of Tables 6, 7 and 8).  
5  Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The paper investigates the empirical relationship between informality and 
trade liberalisation using three different measures of the informal sector (and 
four different indicators of trade liberalisation). One measure of informality is   24
retrieved from household surveys instigated by the ILO and reflects informal 
employment as a share of total employment. The other two - the macro-
eclectic and Schneider (2007) measures - are macro-founded and identify 
informal output as a share of formal output.  Empirical results suggest a 
mixed picture of the relationship between trade liberalisation and informality.  
Cross sectional and time series properties of data appear to contrast each 
other. However, in a dynamic panel estimation set up that account for 
endogeneity, informal employment  is found to decrease with deeper trade 
liberalisation and informal output is found to increase with deeper trade 
liberalisation. No existing theoretical framework is able to replicate these 
empirical findings. Indeed, the sign of the relationship is the same for any 
dimension of informality in all models. Both informal output and 
employment either increase or decrease with deeper trade liberalisation.   
 
Our empirical results may suggest that productivity in the informal sector 
increases after trade liberalisation. Such an outcome is consistent with a 
situation where only the most productive informal firms remain active and 
might even extend production.14 Let us assume that informal output is only 
produced by self-employed individuals.  Productivity gains in the informal 
sector with trade liberalisation would then be consistent with a situation 
where the least productive self-employed relocate to the formal sector where 
trade liberalisation has generated new and comparatively better employment 
opportunities. As skills required for informal employment need not 
necessarily match those for formal sector employment, without loss of 
generality, formal jobs could be considered as homogeneous in skills 
requirement. If we additionally introduce the assumption that the 
productivity of formal firms is heterogeneous, then, from a theoretical point 
of view, trade liberalisation can lead to greater formal employment. In this 
theoretical context, the least productive firms would be forced out of 
                                                 
14 This could be observed even with a rationed access to capital as long as labour hoarding 
remains possible and returns to capital are not too decreasing.   25
production, but any loss in production and employment would be more than 
compensated by the expansion of exporting firms that enjoy lower trade costs 
(and/or cheaper inputs). Overall, formal employment and output would rise 
and informal employment would fall; but informal output could rise and the 
informal share in GDP may also rise.  
 
However, times series analyses and existing empirical evidence at the firm 
level also suggest that the impact of trade liberalisation is country and 
industry specific. Policy makers should therefore pay attention to factors that 
constraint resource reallocation not only across industries within the formal 
sector, but also from the informal to the formal sector. For instance, workers 
who are initially informal should be able to take up any job opportunity in the 
formal sector without any legal penalty. Or, they should be given the 
opportunity to fully reintegrate into the welfare system.15 In addition, policy 
makers would also have to facilitate access to capital (either directly or 
indirectly) for firms/individuals operating in the informal sector. The latter 
approach has often been presented as an important step towards the 
formalisation of informal activities.16  
 
Our paper contributes to qualify at least empirically the relationship between 
the informal sector and the degree of trade liberalisation prevailing in an 
economy. However, further attention, whether theoretical or empirical, 
should be devoted to it as it also represents a key feature to appreciate the 
relationship between poverty and trade. 
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Note: * indicates significance at the 1% level of significance. 
Table 2: Panel Unit root tests: 1990 -2004 
  ZIPS 
 















    48.14 
 














   : 112.88 
 
Labor market flexibility 
 

















   106.2 
 











    





(N=55, T =15)        
 
1971-2004: -0.882 
  (N=55, T =34) 
1990-2004: 49.68* 
(N=55, T =15)      
 
1971-2004: 127.4* 
  (N=55, T =34) 
1990-2004: 98.8 
(N=55, Tmax =15)        
 
1971-2004: 33.1 
           (N=55, Tmax =34) 
Notes: For these tests statistics an asterisk (*) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis. ZIPS is the Im 
et al. (2003) panel unit root test, see equation (6), contains a constant and has a critical value at the 
5% significance level of -1.65. The Hadri (2000) Zμ test statistic corresponding to equation (9) has a 
null hypothesis of stationarity is distributed as standard normal. ZFisher the Maddala and Wu (1999) 
panel unit root tests, also referred to as the Fisher test. ZFisher combines the p-values from N 
independent unit root tests; it assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis 
against the alternative that at least one series in the panel is stationary. Due to the pooling of p-
values from independent unit root tests, ZFisher can be applied to unbalanced panels.   
 
Table 3: Fixed effects – macro-eclectic measure of informality 









       






Trade  flow  KOF       


















990/ 66  915/61  617/ 53  825/55 
Overall R2  0.44 0.45 0.43  0.41 
 
 
Table 4: Fixed effects – ILO measure of informality 










Trade Openness       
Trade/GDP 0.00021* 
(000013) 
    
Trade flows KOF    0.00071** 
(0.00036) 
  





    0.00069*** 











310/ 30  301/ 29  245/ 28  286/ 28 
Overall R2  0.54 0.60 0.68  0.64 
 
 
Table 5: Pooled Mean Group estimates – macro-eclectic measure of 
informality 







     




Trade flows KOF    0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
 
Tariff     
Trade restrictions 
KOF 
  0.0006* 
(0.0000) 
Nobs/ groups  990/ 66  915/61  825/55 
Hausman test of 
efficiency of PMG 
over MG 
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p=0.55 
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896 896  840 840  581 581  742 742 














Chi2(109) = 59.10 
p=1.00 
 
Chi2() = 59.10 
p=1.00 
 






Chi2(81) = 51.24 
p=0.996 
 
Chi2(55) = 47.5 
p=0.753 
   33 
of AR(1) in first 
differences 
Arellano-Bond test 
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335 335  326 326  270 270  311 311 




32/110 32/58  31/110)  31/58  30/110 30/58  30/110 30/58 
Hansen test 
 












Chi2(106) = 24.6 
p=1.00 
Chi2(54) = 25.6 
p=1.000   35 
Arellano-Bond test 
of AR(1) in first 
differences 
Arellano-Bond test 



















z= 1.02, p=0.31 
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Trade Openness      
Trade/GDP -0.0004 
(-0.53) 
   
Trade flows KOF    0.0034*** 
(4.93) 
  

















256 240 152 212 








test of AR(1) in 
first differences 
Arellano-Bond 
test of AR(2) in 
first differences 






z= -0.71, p=0.48 
 




z= -2.56, p=0.01 
 
z= -0.90, p=0.37 
 






z= -0.02, p=0.99 
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Appendix 1: Country listings 
Table A1: Countries in ILO and Macro-eclectic data sets 

































Thailand   
Algeria   Senegal 
Argentina   Singapore 
Australia   South  Africa 
Austria   South  Korea 
Bangladesh Spain 
Belgium   Sri  Lanka 
Benin   Sweden 
Bolivia   Switzerland 
Brazil   Syria 
Cameroon   Thailand 
Canada   United  Kingdom 
Chile   United  States 
China   Uruguay 
Colombia   Venezuela 
Costa Rica  Zambia 
Cote d'Ivoire  Zimbabwe 
Denmark    
Dominican Rep.   
Ecuador    
Egypt    
Finland    
France    
Germany    
Ghana    
Greece    
Guatemala  
Honduras    
Hong Kong   
Hungary    
India    
Indonesia    
Ireland    
Israel    
Italy    
Japan    
Kenya    
Malaysia    
Mexico    
Morocco    
Nepal    
Netherlands  
New Zealand   
Nicaragua    
Nigeria    
Norway    
Pakistan    
Panama      38
Peru    
Philippines  
Portugal      
   39 
Table A2: ILO dataset country-year coverage 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
                   
A l g e r i a               X   X   X   X   4  
Argentina              X X X X X X X X X  9 
Australia  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15 
Austria          X X X X X X X X X X X 11 
Bolivia  X X X X X X X X X X X          11 
Brazil              X  X  X  X  4 
Canada  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15 
Chile              X X X X X X X X X  9 
Colombia      X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13 
Costa  Rica  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15 
Dominican  Republic            X X X X X X X X X  9 
Ecuador  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15 
Finland  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15 
Honduras              X X X X X X X X X  9 
Hungary      X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13 
I n d o n e s i a                 X   X   2  
Israel            X X X X X X X X X X 10 
Japan  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15 
Malaysia            X X X X X X X X X    9 
Mexico    X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 14 
M o r o c c o                X   X   X   3  
New  Zealand  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 14 
Norway              X X X X X X X X X  9 
Pakistan            X X X X X X X X X X 10 
Panama    X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 14 
P e r u                X   X   X   3  
Philippines             X  X  X  X  4 
Singapore    X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 14   40 
S r i   L a n k a                X   X   X   3  
Sweden  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15 
Switzerland  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 14 
Thailand  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15 
                   
Total  9  14 16 16 17 20 25 25 25 25 25 27 30 31 30 335   41
Appendix 2: Informality Measures 
Table A3: Cross-sectional correlation, levels, selected years 




















Schneider (2007)  1990 : 0.802*** 
(9) 
1995 : 0.700*** 
(20) 
2000 : 0.759*** 
(25) 
2004 : 0.712*** 
(30) 
 
1990 : 0.918*** 
(66) 
1995 : 0.951*** 
(66) 
2000 : 0.990*** 
(66) 







Note: ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  Number of observations used to 
calculate the correlation coefficients in brackets.  
   42
Table A4: Cross-sectional correlation, 1st differences, selected years 











































Note: ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Number of observations used to 
calculate the correlation coefficients in brackets.     43




























































































   44
Table A5: Cointegration analysis between Info_ILO and Info_Macro 
  cointegration rank  trace- test  simulated c.v.   
Argentina  r = 0  5.22*  15.93   
  r = 1  0.49  7.36   
Bangladesh  r = 0  16.04  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  1.52*  7.36   
Chile  r = 0  17.11  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  0.66*  7.36   
Colombia  r = 0  16.19  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  0.31*  7.36   
Costa Rica  r = 0  16.35  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  0.26*  7.36   
DR  r = 0  7.19*  15.93   
  r = 1  0.02  7.36   
Ecuador  r = 0  17.80  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  3.85*  7.36   
Honduras  r = 0  16.14  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  2.49*  7.36   
Pakistan  r = 0  7.30*  15.93   
  r = 1  0.53  7.36   
Panama  r = 0  23.33  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  4.43*  7.36   
Thailand  r = 0  11.33*  15.93   
  r = 1  2.11  7.36   
Austria  r = 0  2.98*  15.93   
  r = 1  0.42  7.36   
Finland  r = 0  16.47  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  0.00*  7.36   
Hungary  r = 0  8.50*  15.93   
  r = 1  1.36  7.36   
Norway  r = 0  17.85  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  2.74*  7.36   
Sweden  r = 0  17.35  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  0.01*  7.36   
Switzerland  r = 0  18.58  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  3.46*  7.36   
Australia  r = 0  18.97  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  2.84*  7.36   
Canada  r = 0  19.64  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  4.75*  7.36   
Israel  r = 0  11.95*  15.93   
  r = 1  0.00  7.36   
Japan  r = 0  20.72  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  2.37*  7.36   
New Zealand  r = 0  16.14  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  0.67*  7.36   
Singapore  r = 0  25.02  15.93  coint. 
  r = 1  1.37*  7.36   
Notes: Johansen (1988) Trace test examines whether there is cointegration between the ILO 
measure of informality and the informality measure derived from the macro-eclectic approach. 
The null of cointegrating vectors is given by r. Model selected on the basis of a model reduction   45
procedure and residuals are reasonably well specified. To account for potential small sample 
bias, critical values are simulated for N=14 and a Bartlett correction from Johansen (2002) is 
applied. Star (*) indicates that we reject the null of cointegration. 
   46
Appendix 3: Cross-sectional Analysis 
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Appendix 4: Cointegration Analysis 
 
Table A6: Cointegration Analysis of Informality and Trade openness 
 












Africa            
 Benin  0.0179 0.0037  0.00       
 Cameroon  -0.0067 0.0022  0.00       
 Ct.  d'Ivoire  -0.0040 0.0007  0.00       
 Ghana  0.0036 0.0018  0.05       
 Kenya  0.0067 0.0027  0.01       
 Nigeria  0.0254 0.0128  0.05       
 Senegal  -0.0112 0.0040  0.01       
 S.  Africa  -0.0027 0.0008  0.00       
 Zambia           
 Zimbabwe  -0.0183 0.0070  0.01       
East Asia & 
Pacific 
           
 China  -0.0013 0.0007  0.06       
 Indonesia  0.0287 0.0034  0.00       
 Malaysia  -0.0525 0.0102  0.00  -0.3992 0.1111  0.00 
 Philippines  -0.0113 0.0017  0.00  -0.0647 0.0026  0.00 
 Thailand  -0.0102 0.0023  0.00 0.0044 0.0015  0.00 
Latin America             
 Argentina  -0.0045 0.0011  0.00 0.0020 0.0002  0.00 
 Bolivia  0.0194 0.0060  0.00  0.0375 0.0074  0.00 
 Brazil  -0.0017 0.0004  0.00       
 Chile  -0.0033 0.0002  0.00  -0.0012 0.0002  0.00 
 Colombia  0.0007 0.0004  0.09  -0.0080 0.0016  0.00 
 Costa  Rica  -0.0017 0.0007  0.02  -0.0019 0.0008  0.02 
 DR  -0.0046 0.0014  0.00       
 Ecuador  -0.0039 0.0005  0.00 0.0009 0.0003  0.00 
 Guatemala  -0.0446 0.0224  0.05       
 Honduras           
 Mexico  -0.0031 0.0003  0.00 0.0059 0.0017  0.00 
 Nicaragua  -0.0021 0.0005  0.00       
 Panama  -0.0455 0.0131  0.00 0.0021 0.0012  0.07 
 Peru  -0.0053 0.0029  0.06       
 Uruguay  -0.0037 0.0013  0.01       
 Venezuela  -0.0243 0.0039  0.00         50
 













           
 Algeria  -0.0066 0.0006  0.00       
 Egypt  -0.0633 0.0206  0.00       
 Morocco  -0.0077 0.0045  0.09       
 Syria           
South Asia             
 Bangladesh  -0.0086 0.0024  0.00       
 India  0.0027 0.0007  0.00       
 Nepal           
 Pakistan  -0.0752 0.0195  0.00  -0.0068 0.0035  0.05 
 Sri  Lanka  -0.0416 0.0119  0.00       
High Income             
 Austria  -0.0001 0.0001  0.11 0.0006 0.0000  0.00 
 Belgium  0.0026 0.0012  0.03       
 Denmark  0.0009 0.0006  0.15       
 Finland  0.0015 0.0004  0.00  0.0017 0.0004  0.00 
 France  -0.0007 0.0002  0.01       
 Germany  0.0002 0.0001  0.05       
 Greece  -0.0017 0.0012  0.14       
 Ireland  0.0096 0.0012  0.00       
 Italy  -0.0017 0.0003  0.00       
 Netherlands  -0.0004 0.0003  0.14       
 Norway  -0.0102 0.0016  0.00  -0.0054 0.0015  0.00 
 Portugal  -0.0019 0.0005  0.00       
 Spain  -0.0018 0.0002  0.00       
 Sweden  0.0028 0.0005  0.00  0.0074 0.0014  0.00 
 Switzerland  -0.0002 0.0001  0.10  -0.0019 0.0003  0.00 
 UK  0.0033 0.0010  0.00       
 US  0.0012 0.0003  0.00       
 Australia  0.0011 0.0003  0.00  0.0036 0.0007  0.00 
 Canada  0.0102 0.0022  0.00  -0.0016 0.0003  0.00 
 Japan  0.0012 0.0003  0.00  0.0062 0.0016  0.00 
 N.  Zealand  0.0084 0.0013  0.00  -0.0240 0.0086  0.01 
High Income, 
other 
           
 Korea,  Rep.  -0.0034 0.0008  0.00       
 Israel  -0.0025 0.0004  0.00 0.0003 0.0000  0.00 
 Singapore  -0.0034 0.0015  0.03  -0.0090 0.0028  0.00 
Note:  coefficient estimates of Johansen cointegration regression of data vector consisting of 
informality and trade openness. Coefficients are in vector form and normalized on 
informality variable (not reported). A positive coefficient implies that greater trade openness 
lead to higher informality, a negative coefficient indicates that trade liberalisation leads to a 
reduction in informality.    51
Table A7: Cointegration analysis between Informality and Trade 
Restrictions 
 












Africa             
 Benin  -0.0220  0.0027  0.00      
 Cameroon  -0.01586  0.00943  0.09      
 Cote  d'Ivoire         
 Ghana  0.0108  0.0020  0.00      
 Kenya  -0.0023  0.0009  0.01      
 Nigeria           
 Senegal  -0.0091  0.0018  0.00      
 S.  Africa  -0.00368  0.00148  0.01      
 Zambia  0.0016  0.0009  0.08      
 Zimbabwe  0.0218  0.0057  0.00      
East Asia & 
Pacific 
            
 China  0.0076  0.0024  0.00      
 Indonesia  -0.0035  0.0005  0.00      
 Malaysia  -0.0109  0.0015  0.00  0.0044 0.0003  0.00 
 Philippines  -0.0073  0.0012  0.00      
 Thailand  -0.0108  0.0007  0.00  0.0058 0.0011  0.00 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
             
 Hungary  0.0044  0.0011  0.00  -0.0044 0.0007  0.00 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
             
 Argentina  0.0032  0.0010  0.00  -0.0007 0.0003  0.03 
 Bolivia  -0.0118  0.0010  0.00  -0.0361 0.0063  0.00 
 Brazil  0.0017  0.0006  0.01      
 Chile  -0.0034  0.0006  0.00  -0.0011 0.0003  0.00 
 Colombia  -0.0405  0.0025  0.02  -0.0530 0.0201  0.01 
 Costa  Rica  -0.0003  0.0002  0.08  -0.0010 0.0004  0.01 
 DR  -0.0050  0.0011  0.00      
 Ecuador  -0.0016  0.0008  0.03  0.0394 0.0079  0.00 
 Guatemala  -0.0158  0.0035  0.00      
 Honduras           
 Mexico  0.0131  0.0053  0.02  -0.0223 0.0069  0.00 
 Nicaragua  -0.0006  0.0002  0.01      
 Panama  -0.0057  0.0008  0.00  -0.0012 0.0005  0.01 
 Peru  0.0300  0.0108  0.01      
 Uruguay  -0.0049  0.0023  0.03      
 Venezuela  -0.0057  0.0028  0.04        52
 














Middle East & 
North Africa 
             
 Algeria  -0.0076  0.0013  0.00  0.0041 0.0022  0.07 
 Egypt  0.0142  0.0045  0.00      
 Morocco  -0.0558  0.0246  0.02      
  Syrian Arab Republic         
South Asia              
 Bangladesh  -0.0047  0.0012  0.00      
 India  0.0036  0.0010  0.00      
 Nepal  -0.0166  0.0067  0.01      
 Pakistan  -0.0019  0.0006  0.00  0.0020 0.0002  0.00 
 Sri  Lanka  -0.0032  0.0003  0.00      
High Income               
 Austria  -0.0002  0.0001  0.05  -0.0056 0.0015  0.00 
 Belgium           
 Denmark           
 Finland  0.0153  0.0034  0.00  0.003793 0.000783  0 
 France  -0.00108  0.00034  0.01      
 Germany           
 Greece  -0.0020  0.0004  0.00      
 Ireland  0.0104  0.0026  0.00      
 Italy           
 Netherlands  -0.0009  0.0004  0.02      
 Norway  -0.0083  0.0029  0.00  -0.0028 0.0003  0.00 
 Portugal  -0.0168  0.0051  0.00      
 Spain  -0.0097  0.0014  0.00      
 Sweden           
 Switzerland  -0.0006  0.0003  0.05  -0.0087 0.0027  0.00 
 United  Kingdom         
 USA  0.0065  0.0006  0.00      
 Australia  0.0010  0.0001  0.00  0.0044 0.0006  0.00 
 Canada  0.0031  0.0003  0.00  0.0011 0.0005  0.04 
 Japan  -0.0009  0.0003  0.00  0.0022 0.0005  0.00 
 N.  Zealand  0.0023  0.0005  0.00  0.0036 0.0011  0.00 
High Income, 
other 
            
 Korea,  Rep.  -0.0125  0.0013  0.00      
 Israel  -0.0022  0.0001  0.00  0.0004 0.0001  0.00 
 Singapore  0.0036  0.0014  0.01  0.0089 0.0045  0.05 
Note:  coefficient estimates of Johansen cointegration regression of data vector consisting of 
informality and trade restrictions. Coefficients are in vector form and normalized on 
informality variable (not reported). A positive coefficient implies that lower restrictions on 
trade (e.g lower import tariffs) lead to a reduction in informality; a negative coefficient 
indicates that trade liberalisation leads to higher informality.  
 